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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 890376 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2 (3) (j) . 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether Appellants Shire Development Company Inc. 
("Shire") and Albert Charboneau ("Charboneau") have standing as 
joint venturers with the named purchaser under a real estate 
contract to recover amounts paid by them to Respondents Frontier 
Investments and its partners (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "Frontier11) for the purchase of the real property, which 
payments Frontier purported to retain as liquidated damages when 
Frontier forfeited the purchaser's interest in the real estate 
contract* 
III. 
INTRODUCTION 
In November, 1984, Frontier sold certain vacant land 
(the "Property") in Wendover, Nevada to one Steven T. Glezos 
("Glezos") under a Real Estate Sales Contract. Shortly 
thereafter, Shire and Charboneau entered into an oral joint 
venture agreement with Glezos to purchase the Property from 
Frontier. Pursuant to that agreement, Shire and Charboneau paid 
directly to Frontier $80,725.11 of the total of $91,725.11 paid 
for the Property. In March, 1985, a few months after the 
contract was entered into, the contract went into default and 
Frontier purported to forfeit the purchaser's interest in the 
Property and retain the entire amount paid as liquidated 
damages. 
Thereafter, in settlement of a federal court lawsuit 
brought by Glezos to recover the money paid under the contract, 
Frontier and Glezos entered into an agreement pursuant to which 
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Frontier settled Glezos* claim for the $11,000.00 he paid 
towards the purchase of the Property. In that agreement, 
Frontier and Glezos expressly acknowledged that they were not 
settling any claims which Shire and Charboneau had for the 
$80,725.11 which they paid towards the purchase of the Property. 
Shire and Charboneau then commenced this action seeking 
to recover the money they paid Frontier towards purchase of the 
Property. The district court ruled on summary judgment that 
Shire and Charboneau had no standing to recover the money they 
paid Frontier because they had no rights in the contract. It is 
respectfully submitted that this conclusion was in error, and 
that Shire and Charboneau, as joint venturers with Glezos, have 
standing to recover the amounts they paid for purchase of the 
Property. Accordingly, the Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Proceedings Below. 
Shire and Charboneau commenced this action seeking to 
recover the sum of $80,725.11 which they paid Frontier towards 
the purchase of the Property on the ground that it would be an 
unconscionable penalty to allow Frontier to keep all the funds 
paid towards purchase of the Property. 
In February, 1988, Frontier filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, arguing that Shire and Charboneau had no standing to 
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assert the claims made. The district court rejected most of the 
grounds asserted by Frontier in support of its Motion, but 
nevertheless granted Frontier Summary Judgment on the basis that 
Shire and Charboneau were not named parties to the contract. 
The district court erroneously ruled they had not received an 
oral or written assignment of any rights in the Property from 
Glezos. 
The court entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment on 
August 4, 1989. Shire and Charboneau filed their Notice of 
Appeal on August 21, 1989. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The following undisputed facts were established by the 
record: 
1. On or about October 22, 1984, Glezos, as purchaser, 
entered into a written real estate contract with Frontier, as 
seller, for the purchase of .841 acres of real property located 
in Wendover, Nevada for a total purchase price of $126,150.00. 
[R. 70-71] 
2. Ten days later, on November 1, 1984, Frontier and 
Glezos entered into a second real estate contract (the 
"Contract11) which superseded the October contract. Pursuant to 
the Contract, the parties agreed to the purchase of a larger 
parcel of real property by Glezos containing 5., 997 acres, 
including the original parcel. The purchase price for the 
Property was $765,494.00, payable in installments. [R. 71] 
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3. Shortly after Glezos entered into the Contract, he 
entered into an oral joint venture agreement with Shire and 
Charboneau for the purchase of the Property pursuant to which 
the parties agreed to share the profits derived from the 
Property in the same proportion as their contributions toward 
the purchase of the Property. Pursuant to this agreement, Shire 
paid $50,725.11 and Charboneau paid $30,000.00 to Frontier 
towards the purchase. Glezos paid only $11,000.00. [R. 135-136, 
145, 152] 
4. The checks representing Charboneaufs and Shire's 
contributions towards the joint venture were made payable to 
Frontier as installment payments due under the Contract, were 
drawn on Shire's checking account and were paid directly to 
Frontier. One of these checks was actually picked up in person 
at Shire's corporate offices by some of Frontier's partners, 
Roger Trounday, Mark Chilton and Ward Chilton [R. 136] 
5. An installment payment on the Contract in the sum of 
$83,744.00 due on or about February 20, 1985 was not paid. 
Consequently, Frontier elected to and did forfeit the Contract 
and purported to retain all funds previously paid as liquidated 
damages. [R. 72] 
6. Glezos then brought an action against Frontier in 
federal court to recover all amounts paid for purchase of the 
Property. Shire and Charboneau filed a motion to intervene on 
the basis that they were entitled to recover all but $11,000.00 
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of the payments made to Frontier. Prior to resolution of the 
motion, Glezos entered into an agreement with Shire and 
Charboneau, recognizing his joint venture with Shire and 
Charboneau and agreeing that they were entitled to share in any 
proceeds of a settlement or judgment in the same proportion as 
their contributions for the purchase of the Property. The 
agreement also required written approval of a majority of the 
joint venturers to any settlement and that Shire and Charboneau 
withdraw their Motion to Intervene. [R. 145 and 148-149] A copy 
of the agreement is attached hereto as Addendum lf AM. 
7. Thereafter, Glezos and Frontier entered into 
settlement discussions with reference to the federal court 
action. Both Glezos and Respondent Ward Chilton, one of 
Frontier's partners, asked Shire to agree to a proposed 
settlement. Shire and Charboneau refused to agree to the 
settlement proposed by Glezos and Frontier. Without informing 
Shire and Charboneau, Glezos and Frontier then entered into a 
written settlement agreement, which Frontier well knew Shire and 
Charboneau did not approve or have knowledge of, and the federal 
court action was dismissed. The settlement agreement between 
Glezos and Frontier expressly recognized that they were only 
settling whatever claims Glezos had with respect to the 
$11,000.00 he contributed towards purchase of the Property. The 
agreement did not purport to settle whatever claims Shire and 
Charboneau had with respect to the $80,72 5.11 they contributed 
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towards the purchase of the Property. [R. 73, 136-137, 156] A 
copy of the agreement is attached hereto as Addendum "B". 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. A seller who forfeits a buyer's interest under a 
real estate contract is only entitled to retain amounts paid 
under the contract if the amounts bear a reasonable relationship 
to the seller's actual damages. There is admittedly a question 
of fact in the case at bar as to whether the amounts retained by 
Frontier constituted an unenforceable penalty. 
2. Even though Shire and Charboneau are not named 
parties to the Contract, they nevertheless have standing to 
recover the amounts they paid Frontier because they were joint 
venturers with Glezos for the purchase of the Property. There 
is clearly sufficient evidence in the record from which a finder 
of fact could conclude that Frontier had actual knowledge that 
Glezos had formed a joint venture for purchase of the Property. 
In this regard, the Contract allowed Glezos to assign his 
interest without Frontier's consent. Property may be acquired 
and owned jointly by a joint venture although the title is in 
the name of only one of the co-venturers. Property acquired 
with joint venture funds is deemed joint venture property in the 
absence of a contrary intention. The joint venture agreement 
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was not required to be in writing. In any event, a written 
agreement between Glezos, Shire and Charboneau does exist 
recognizing the joint venture. 
3. Shire and Charboneau are the only parties with any 
possible right to bring this equitable action to recover the 
amounts they paid to Frontier on the Contract. If they are 
precluded from doing so, Frontier will receive a windfall. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
It is well settled that in considering an appeal of a 
Summary Judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences must 
be viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant and no 
deference is to be given to the trial court's conclusions of 
law. Summary judgment was not proper in this case because 
utilizing those standards material issues of fact existed 
requiring resolution at trial. See, e.g., Seftel v. Capitol 
City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah App. 1989); Payne ex rel 
Pavne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 187-188 (Utah 1987); Scharf v. 
B.M.G. Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Guardian State 
Bank v. Humphries, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988) . 
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B. Issues of Fact Exist As to Whether Frontier Can 
Retain All Payments Made, 
Frontier purported to retain the $91,725.11 paid on the 
Contract in reliance upon a liquidated damages provision 
contained therein. Although such provisions are sometimes 
enforceable, a seller is not permitted to retain all amounts 
paid under a contract where the amount retained bears no 
reasonable relationship to the seller's actual damages, Allen 
v. Kingdom, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986); Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 
1082 (Utah 1983); Haromv v. Sawyer, 654 P.2d 1022 (Nev. 1982). 
Frontier did not seek summary judgment on the basis that there 
was no factual issue as to whether the $91,725.11 which it 
retained had any reasonable relation to its damages, if any. 
Admittedly, material issues of fact exist in that regard. 
C. Shire and Charboneau Have Standing to Maintain This 
Action. 
In the court below, Frontier argued that Shire and 
Charboneau had no standing to recover amounts they paid Frontier 
for purchase of the Property because they were not named parties 
to the Contract between Frontier, as seller, and Glezos, as 
purchaser. Shire and Charboneau don't have any quarrel with the 
general proposition that a stranger to a contract cannot bring 
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suit on that contract. However, that is not the situation in 
the case at bar. It is simply not open to dispute, at least for 
purposes of Frontier's Summary Judgment Motion, that a joint 
venture was formed between Glezos, Shire and Charboneau shortly 
after Glezos entered into the Contract with Frontier pursuant to 
which the joint venture was purchasing the Property. See, Bowen 
v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). 
The Contract with Frontier allowed assignment of Glezos1 
interest without consent. Paragraph 8 provided: 
Nominee or Assignee. Any nominee designated 
by buyer and any assignee of the buyer shall 
succeed to any and may exercise all of buyer's 
rights and immunities, and upon such designation of 
nominee or assignee, buyer's nominee or assignee 
shall be substituted as buyer herein. 
Paragraph 9 in turn provided: 
Benefits. This contract shall inure to the 
benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto 
and their respective successors, heirs, executors, 
administrators, assigns and nominees. 
As joint venturers for the purchase of the Property, 
Shire and Charboneau are by operation of law assignees of the 
purchaser. They are therefore entitled to recover amounts paid 
by them to Frontier, subject to whatever defenses Frontier has 
on the contract.1 See, Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 P. 2d 464 (Utah 
Because Glezos was one of the joint venturers in the joint 
venture and therefore still had an interest in the Contract, Glezos 
would ordinarily be a necessary party. Kemp v. Murray, 680 P. 2d 
758 (Utah 1984). However, it was not necessary to join Glezos in 
this case because Frontier had already settled with him. 
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1962) Essex v. Ryan. 446 N.E.2d 368 (Ind.App. 1983); Reich v. 
Kimnach. 216 S.E.2d 58 (Vir. 1975). 
Tomino v. Greater Park City Co. , 570 P. 2d 698 (Utah 
1977) is closely on point. In that case, the plaintiff, who was 
an assignee of the purchaser under a contract to acquire certain 
real property in Park City, sought return of partial payments 
made. The seller/defendant asserted it was entitled to retain 
the payments under the liquidated damage provision in the 
contract. This Court upheld a judgment in favor of the 
assignee, rejecting defendant's theory of forfeiture. 
Frontier asserted below that it had no notice of Shire's 
and Charboneau's interest in the Property and therefore any 
assignment was not effective. The facts demonstrate otherwise. 
First, all but $11,000.00 of the payments made for purchase of 
the Property were paid to Frontier by Shire and Charboneau on 
Shire checks. In fact, on one occasion, Frontier picked up a 
payment from Shire at Shire's offices in Salt Lake City. 
Second, it is beyond dispute that long before Frontier secretly 
settled with Glezos in the federal court action to avoid the 
fact that Shire and Charboneau would not agree to the proposed 
settlement, Frontier was fully informed of the extent and nature 
of Shire's and Charboneau's interest in the joint venture. In 
fact, the Release between Frontier and Glezos specifically 
acknowledged that the settlement only resolved Glezos' claim on 
the $11,000.00 he paid Frontier and not any claim that Share and 
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Charboneau had arising out of their payments to Frontier, The 
Release provided in part: 
Glezos hereby releases Frontier from all 
claims relating to the $11,000,00 he personally 
provided for payments to Frontier under the 
disputed real estate purchase agreements, Glezos 
does not intend by giving such Release, to release 
or affect in any way, favorably or unfavorably, any 
claims which Albert Charboneau or Shire Development 
Inc, may have against Frontier relating to funds 
either of them provided for payment to Frontier 
under the disputed real estate agreements, 
[Emphasis Added] 
The district court apparently believed that the fact 
that Glezos agreed to a joint venture for the purchase of the 
Property was not sufficient to constitute an assignment which 
would give Shire and Charboneau rights in the Contract even 
though the court expressly rejected Frontier's assertion that 
any assignment would have had to be in writing. [R. 187, at p. 
16] It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in this 
regard. 
The fact that the Contract was only in the name of 
Glezos and the joint venture was never substituted as the named 
purchaser is not controlling. Property may be acquired and 
owned jointly by a joint venture although the title is in the 
name of only one of the co-venturers. 4 6 Am Jur 2d. Joint 
Ventures, Section 17. Furthermore, property acquired with 
partnership or joint venture funds is deemed partnership or 
joint venture property in the absence of a contrary intention, 
H. Reuschlein and W. Gregory, Agency and Partnership, Section 
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214 (1979) ; J. Crane and A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership, 
Section 37(c) at p. 207 (1968); 46 Am Jur 2d, Joint Ventures, 
Section 40; Paganucchi v. Kalpouzos, 178 P.2d 62, 64 (Cal. 
1947) • As the district court ruled below, a joint venture 
agreement for the purchase of real property is not required to 
be in writing. Ellingson v. Sloan, 527 P.2d 1100 (Ariz.App. 
1975)-2 Once the joint venture is proven, the joint venturer 
holding title or an interest in the real property holds it in 
trust for the other venturers, Harestad v. Weitzel, 536 P. 2d 
522 (Ore, 1975). 
The undisputed evidence before the district court was 
that after Glezos executed the Contract, he entered into the 
oral joint venture agreement with Shire and Charboneau to 
purchase the Property. Shire and Charboneau then paid all 
further payments of the purchase price directly to Frontier. 
Glezos later signed an agreement after Shire and Charboneau 
filed their Motion to Intervene in the federal court action 
expressly recognizing the joint venture for the purchase of the 
Property, that Charboneau and Shire had contributed money for 
the purchase of the Property, and that they were entitled to 
share in any recovery of the purchase price in the same 
Even if the joint venture agreement were required to be in 
writing, Frontier could not assert the statute of frauds because 
it was not a party to the joint venture agreement. Family Finance 
Fund v. Abraham, 657 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1982); Harmon v. Tanner Motor 
Tours, 377 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1963). 
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percentage as their respective contributions towards the 
purchase of the Property. The agreement also provided that the 
federal court action could only be settled based upon the 
majority approval of Glezos, Shire and Charboneau, Moreover, 
the settlement agreement entered into between Glezos and 
Frontier by which they settled the federal court lawsuit 
specifically acknowledged that they were only settling Glezos1 
claim for the $11,000,00 he paid towards the purchase of the 
Property and that they were not settling any claim that Shire 
and Charboneau had for the money they paid towards purchase of 
the Property. Under these facts, it simply makes no sense to 
preclude Shire and Charboneau from maintaining an action to 
recover the amounts they paid to Frontier under their joint 
venture for the purchase of the Property. 
Finally, Shire and Charboneau do not seek by this action 
to enforce any contractual rights of Glezos. Rather, they seek 
equitable relief from the unconscionable penalty provided by the 
strict terms of the Contract which allows Frontier to keep all 
payments which Shire and Charboneau made. Who better to seek 
recovery of amounts paid in a forfeiture case than the parties 
who paid the money? In fact, unless Shire and Charboneau have 
standing to assert that claim, then Frontier stands to receive 
a substantial windfall because Glezos has already given up any 
claims that he has against Frontier when he settled with respect 
to the $11,000.00 he paid for the Property. 
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CONCLUSION 
Shire and Charboneau paid $80,725.11 directly to 
Frontier for the purchase of the Property- There is clearly 
sufficient evidence in the record from which the finder of fact 
could conclude that Frontier had knowledge that Glezos had 
entered into a joint venture with Shire and Charboneau for the 
purchase of the Property as he was permitted by the Contract to 
do. Thus, Shire and Charboneau have standing to maintain this 
equitable action to recover their payments. To hold otherwise 
would mean that no one has any right to maintain an action 
against Frontier to recover the penalty and would result in an 
unconscionable windfall to Frontier. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Summary Judgment 
should be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
DATED this 01 —day of October, 1989. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
N
 ) JI 
Mitchell 
js shireapp\brief 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed four 
(4) copies of the within Brief of Appellants to the following 
party by depositing the same in U.S. mails, postage prepaid, 
this 3 1 — d aY o f October, 1989: 
David A. Greenwood, Esq. 
Marvin D. Bagley, Esq. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Respondent 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is made and entered into this 25th day of 
September, 1986, by and between STEVEN T. GLEZOS ("Glezos") and 
SHIRE DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation ("Shire") and BERT 
CHARBONEAU ("Charboneau") by and through their respective 
attorneys with reference to the following facts, 
WHEREAS, Glezos has commences a legal action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division, entitled: Steven T. Glezos, Plantiff, v. Frontier 
Investments, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 85C-1004G (the 
"pending action"), in which action Glezos is seeking to recover 
the sum of approximately $90,000.00 paid to Frontier Investments 
for the purchase of certain real property located m the State 
of Nevada (the "property"); and 
WHEREAS, Charboneau contributed $30,000.00 for the 
purchase of the property and Shire and Glezos also contributed 
various sums for the purchase of the property; and 
WHEREAS, Shire, Charboneau and Utah Cross]ng Ltd. have 
filed a Motion in the pending action seeking leave to intervene 
as Plaintiffs to assert a right to all or a portion of any funds 
recovered from Frontier Investments; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
1. Glezos, Shire and Charboneau are entitled to share in 
the proceeds of any judgment or settlement obtained from 
Frontier Investments in the pending action, after deducting 
EXHIBIT A 
000148 
pending action, m the same percentage as their respective 
contributions toward the purchase of the property bear to the 
total amount paid towards purchase of the property. 
Charboneau's share of any settlement or judgment, based upon his 
contribution of $30,000.00, shall be paid to him as soon as 
possible after receipt of funds fiom Frontier Investments. The 
remainder of the funds received from Frontier Investments shall 
be placed in an J riterest-bearmg account requiring both the 
signatures of counsel for both Shire and Glezos for any 
withdrawals pending an agreement between Shire and Glezos for 
the release of such funds. ' 
2. Any settlement of the pending action by GLezos shall 
require written approval from any two of Glezos, Shire and 
Charboneau. 
3. Shire and Charboneau shall cause the Motion to 
Intervene an the pending action to be withdrawn. 
4. The undersigned attorneys represent and warrant that 
they have the full right and authority from their respective 
clients to execute this Agreement on their behalf. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Agreement the day and date first above written. 
WARDS,^-GARDINER & BROWN 
Step; 
Attorn 
>toker 
for Steven T. Glezos 
000149 
BURBI MITCHELL 
Ste(jbJffl\B. M i t c h e l l 
A t t o r n e y s fo r S h i r e and 
Charboneau 
dd5401a 
"EXHIBIT E 
(Attached to and forming a part of the Real 
Property Purchase Agreement, dated October 
13, 1987, between Frontier Investments, as 
Seller, and Steven T. Glezos, as Buyer.) 
RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE 
THIS RELEASE OF CLAIMS AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE ("Agreement") 
is made and entered into as of the day of November, 1987, 
by and between FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a Nevada limited 
partnership, (hereinafter referred to as "Frontier"), and STEVEN 
T. GLEZOS, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
(hereinafter referred to as "Glezos"). 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, Frontier and Glezos entered into that certain Real 
Property Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement") dated 
October 13, 1987, for the purpose of settling the dispute between 
them which is the subject of Civil No. 85C-10046 (the "Action") 
filed in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah; and 
WHEREAS, Section 1,5 of the Purchase Agreement requires that 
the Buyer release the Seller from certain claims and covenant not 
to sue the Seller, as hereinafter set forth; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
promises contained herein and other good and valuable 
consideration, Frontier and Glezos agree as follows: 
1. Concurrently with the execution of this Agreement, 
Frontier shall perform its obligations to Glezos pursuant to the 
terms of the Purchase Agreement. 
2. Glezos, for himself and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under him, does hereby release, acquit, and discharge 
Frontier, and all of Frontier's affiliated entities, 
corporations, partnerships, officers, directors, shareholders, 
agents, partners, attorneys, employees, and representatives of 
any nature, and their successors, heirs, and assigns, and each of 
them from claims as follows: 
(a) In the Action, Glezos asserted damage claims of over 
$90,000 relating to purchase agreements for real property in 
Wendover, Nevada. Glezos represents to Frontier that of the 
EXHIBIT B 
mouthy pdid to frontier under the disputed contracts, o n l Y $11,000 
came from the personal funds of Glezos, and that the remainder 
came either from funds of Albert Charboneau or from funds 
borrowed by Shire Development, Inc., a Utah corporation, from 
Moore Financial with guarantees from C.N. Zundel and Glezos. 
(b) Glezos hereby releases Frontier from all claims 
relating to the $11,000 he personally provided for payments to 
Frontier under the disputed real estate purchase agreements, 
Glezos does nor intend by giving such release to release or 
effect in any way, favorably or unfavorably, any claims which 
Aloert Charboneau or Shire Development, Inc. may have against 
Frontier relating to funds either of them provided for payment to 
Frontier under the disputed real estate agreements. By 
mentioning the potential claims of Albert Charboneau and Shire 
Development, Inc. in this release, Glezos does not intend to 
enhance or strengthen those claims in any way or to create claims 
if none exist. Glezos does, however, specifically reserve the 
right, in his sole discretion, to assign to Albert Charboneau 
and/or Shire Development Inc. any claims he asserted in the 
Action relating to funds provided by Albert Charboneau or Shire 
Development, Inc. for payment to Frontier under the real estate 
purchase agreements disputed in the Action. By signing this 
document, Glezos acknowledges that Frontier does not intend to 
enhance or strengthen any potential claims of Albert Charboneau 
or Shire Development, Inc. relating to the subject matter of the 
Action or to create claims if none exist. 
(c) Although Glezos reserves the right to assign to Albert 
Charboneau and/or Shire Development, Inc. any claims Glezos 
asserted in the Action relating to funds provided by Albert 
Charboneau or Shire Development, Inc. for payment to Frontier 
under the real estate purchase agreements disputed in the Action, 
Glezos hereby covenants that he personally will not again sue 
Frontier or any of the other parties named as defendants in the 
Action for claims relating to the subject matter of the Action or 
which arose prior to the date of this Agreement. This covenant 
not to sue is personal to Glezos and is nor. intended to in any 
way impair the rights, if any, of Albert Charboneau or Shire 
Development, Inc. if Glezos assigns claims to either or both of 
them relating to funds they provided for payment to Frontier 
under the disputed real estate purchase agreements. 
3 . The parties hereto warrant and agree in executing this 
Release of Claims and Covenant Not to Sue that they have relied 
on their own judgment, belief and knowledge and not on the 
representations or statements made by any of the parties released 
or anyone representing them, except such representations as are 
set forth in the Purchase Agreement. 
4. The reservation by Glezos of the alleged claims of 
Albert Charboneau and Shire Development, Inc. against Frontier 
shall not for any purpose be deemed or argued to be an admission 
of responsibility or an acknowledgement of the accuracy of any 
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allegations made by Albert Charboneau/ Shire Development, Inc. 
or Glezos. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF Glezos has executed this Release 
Agreement as of the day and year first abpve written. 
/I 
££±££1 S t e v e h T. Gl£2>cfs 
> 
